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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
THELMA EDLUND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTA~ THE STATE INSURANCE 
FUND, RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
BLACK & ROBERTS, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
7709 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As Plaintiff's attorney stated in his brief, this case 
commenced by an application filed by Thelma Edlund with 
the Industrial Commission on September 1, 1950, in which 
she requested benefits under the Utah Occupational Disease 
Disability Law. She claimed that she had become disabled 
from work because of occupational arthritis in her fingers 
as the result of constant typing over a period of many years. 
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We agree with Plaintiff's attorney that applicant testi-
fied as he has indicated on pages 2 and 3 of his brief. Prac-
tically all of the testimony of the applicant regarding the 
pain and swelling in her fingers and the time when it 
started and regarding the use of her hands and fingers, 
both in her office work and in her own home, was such 
that it was exclusively within her own knowledge; it would 
be impossible to obtain evidence to the contrary even though 
some of her statements might not have been exactly cor-
rect. 
The Justices of this Court and most members of the 
bar can appreciate applicant's testimony that legal work re-
quires typing of several carbon copies and that such work 
requires that more force be applied by the typist's fingers to 
the keys of a manually operated typewriter than does ordin-
ary typing. On the other hand, when applicant was being 
questioned about the use of her hands in her house work, 
it is quite apparent that she was attempting to minimize the 
importance of the tasks she performed around her home (R. 
21 and 22). It is somewhat difficult to accept at 100% face 
value her statement that her oldest daughter did most of 
the house work from the time she was 8 years of age until 
she was 14 years of age, in a household of two adults and 
two children. 
With respect to the three doctors who testified at the 
hearing, we do not feel that Plaintiff's brief contains a 
complete summarization of their testimony, but it refers 
particularly to the testimony which was most favorable to 
Plaintiff's case. 
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Dr. Robert D. Beech, a specialist in internal medicine, 
stated that in addition to the arthritis in the end joints of 
plaintiff's fingers, the only other conditions she had of 
any importance were moderate obesity and mild hyperten-
sion (R. 29). This doctor stated that medical science has 
not yet reached a definite conclusion as to what are the 
causes of osteoarthritis; but he said that age and injury 
have been thought to be two of the possibilities (R. 31). 
He mentioned Dr. Philip S. Hench, a man who has become 
famous because of his connection with the use of cortisone 
in the treatment of arthritis. Dr. Hench recently wrote an 
article in which he stated, in substance, that arthritis in the 
fingers is found less often in elderly typists and needle-
workers than in people who do not use their hands and 
fingers to any great extent (R. 34 and 35). 
Dr. Beech also testified that Mrs. Edlund's was the 
only case he had ever seen, in which the arthritis was claim-
ed to have resulted from the work engaged in (R. 35). This 
thought becomes of some importance in our later discussion 
of the question of whether arthritis in the fingers is an oc-
cupational disease. 
Dr. Beech also said that when a typist strikes the keys 
of a typewriter there would possibly be no more trauma 
than the force exerted on the heels of a person walking down 
the street (R. 37). On the same page is found Dr. Beech's 
affirmative answer to Plaintiff's attorney's question, that 
"osteoarthritis is what some of the specialists call a wear 
and tear type of arthritis." 
Dr. Norman R. Beck, an orthopedic specialist, as stated 
in Plaintiff's brief, testified that osteoarthritis is considered 
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to be a degenerative disease, the cause of which is not 
definitely known (R. 46). For the most part it comes on 
with age; but some individuals have it at an earlier age than 
others. The lessening of the blood supply to the arthritic 
area seems to have something to do with it (R. 50). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT 
COMPELLED TO FIND THAT APPLICANT'S 
ARTHRITIS WAS CAUSED BY EXPOSURE IN 
HER EMPLOYMENT. 
Plaintiff's attorney, at pages 7, 8 and 10 of his brief, 
pointed out that the Industrial Commission did not find 
that Mrs. Edlund's work caused the arthritis in her finger 
joints but that the Referee "assumed" that it did. Plaintiff's 
attorney then argues that the evidence was such as to compel 
a finding that it did. In the third paragraph of the Referee's 
recommended Findings and Conclusions, which were adopted 
by the Commission as part of its Order of March 26, 1951, 
the Referee said : 
"Assuming a direct causal connection between 
the conditions under which her work was performed 
and the condition which developed, applicant must 
also establish (1) that the disease or injury to health 
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident 
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned 
by the employment, (2) the disease or injury to 
health is incidental to the character of the business," 
etc. 
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The Referee probably meant, "If we assume a direct 
causal connection, (without deciding whether there was 
such connection), for the purpose of going on to the next 
point, applicant still would not be entitled to compensation 
because of the other requirements of the Occupational Di-
sease Law." 
We think that Plaintiff's attorney was in error when 
he argued, at page 10 of his brief, that "a finding was 
mandatory that there was such a direct causal connection." 
The one point upon which all of the medical experts agreed 
was that nobody knows definitely what causes arthritis 
(R. 31 and 49). In the face of such medical opinions, why 
would it be arbitrary and capricious, as Plaintiff has argued, 
if a finding were made that applicant's typing work in her 
employment was not the cause of the arthritis in her 
fingers? Why would it not have been just as reasonable to 
expect arthritis to have developed in the next higher joints 
in her fingers, as in the end joints, if the typing was what 
caused the arthritis? Both the end joint and the second 
joint of each finger receives a certain amount of jolt or 
jar when the finger hits a typewriter key. 
Dr. McQuarrie, applicant's family physician, a general 
practitioner, not an internist or orthopedic specialist, in an-
swering a question about causation, (R. 42), said: 
"Yes, my opinion is that the type of work she 
does and the stress and strain would definitely be a 
causative factor in the development of the osteo-
arthritis ; not the total cause but the contributing 
cause of it." 
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POINT 2. 
APPLICANT'S CONDITION OF ARTHRITIS IN 
HER FINGERS DOES NOT COME WITHIN 
THE NECESSARY REQUIREMENTS OF SEC-
TION 28 OF THE UTAH OCCUPATIONAL 
DISEASE LAW. 
Before we get into a discussion of Section 28, we shall 
call attention to some of the fundamental provisions of the 
Occupational Disease Law, which is found at Title 42, 
Chapter la of the Utah Code Annotated. 
Section 42-la-13, subsection (a) provides: 
"There is imposed upon every employer a liabil-
ity for the payment of compensation to every em-
ployee who becomes totally disabled by reason of an 
occupational disease * * * " 
Section 42-la-27 reads as follows: 
"The occupational diseases hereinafter defined 
shall be deemed to arise out of the employment, only 
if there is a direct causal connection between the 
conditions under which the work is performed and 
the occupational disease, and which can be seen to 
have followed as a natural incident of the work as a 
result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of 
the employment, and which can be fairly traced to 
the employment as the proximate cause, and which 
does not come from a hazard to which workmen 
would have been equally exposed outside of the em-
ployment. The disease must be incidental to the 
character of the business and not independent of the 
relation of employer and employee. The disease need 
not have been foreseen or expected but after its con-
traction it must appear to have had its origin in a 
risk connected with the employment, and to have 
flowed from that source as a natural consequence." 
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Section 42-1a-28 reads: 
''For the purpose of this act only the diseases 
enumerated in this section shall be deemed to be 
occupational diseases:" 
(The first 27 subsections list anthrax, glanders and 
various metallic poisonings and other disorders caused by 
contact with chemical and other substances. Then comes 
subsection 28, which was enacted by the 1949 Legislature.) 
Subsection 28. 
"Such other diseases or injuries to health which 
directly arise as a natural incident of the exposure 
occasioned by the employment, provided, however, 
that such a disease or injury to health shall be com-
pensable only in those instances where it is shown by 
the employee or his dependents that all of the follow-
ing named circumstances were present : ( 1) a direct 
causal connection between the conditions under 
which the work is performed and the disease or in-
jury to health; (2) the disease or injury to health 
can be seen to have followed as a natural incident 
of the work as a result of the exposure occasioned 
by the employment; (3) the disease or injury to 
health can be fairly traced to the employment as the 
proximate cause; ( 4) the disease or injury to health 
is not of a character to which the employee may have 
had substantial exposure outside of the employment; 
( 5) the disease or injury to health is incidental to the 
character of the business and not independent of the 
relation of the employer and employee; and ( 6) the 
disease or injury to health must appear to have had 
its origin in a risk connected with the employment 
and to have flowed from that source as a natural con-
sequence, though it need not have been foreseen or 
expected before discovery. No disease or injury to 
health shall be found compensable where it is of a 
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character to which the general public is commonly 
exposed." 
Plaintiff's attorney, at pages 16 and 19 of his brief, has 
taken vigorous exception to the Industrial Commission's 
conclusion that "the legislature clearly intended to make 
compensable only those diseases which can be recognized as 
commonly associated with a particular employment, as 
silicosis is associated with metal mining." He argues that 
all that is needed is that the six requirements specified in 
subsection 28 of Section 28, as above quoted, shall exist 
in the case. Apparently he does not realize that among the 
two unnumbered provisions and the six numbered require-
ments of subsection 28 above quoted are three provisions 
which definitely support the Industrial Commission's con-
clusion. 
We call attention to the first provision, that the disease 
must "directly arise as a natural incident of the exposure 
occasioned by the employment." Also point numbered 2 re-
quires that the disease was "a natural incident of the work." 
and point numbered 5 requires that the disease is "incidental 
to the character of the business..'' 
With respect to the meaning of words and phrases 
found in the occupational disease law and other parts of the 
Utah Code, the following provisions are applicable: 
Section 88-2-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1943: 
"Words and phrases are to be construed accord-
ing to the context and the approved usage of the 
language ; but technical words and phrases, and 
such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropri-
ate meaning in law, or are defined by statute, are to 
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be construed according to such peculiar and appropri-
ate meaning or definition." 
So far as we have been able to ascertain, the words, 
"natural," "incident" and "incidental" are not technical 
words and have not acquired a peculiar legal meaning. 
Therefore we have gone to Webster's dictio~ary to determine 
what is the approved usage of those words. We find that 
the word, "natural" means "in accordance with or due to 
the conditions, events or circumstances of the case; in line 
with normal experience." "Natural" also means "truly rep-
resenting or expressing one's nature, etc." "Natural" has 
the synonyms, "common," "ordinary," "regular" and 
"usual." 
The word "incident" means "that which happens or 
takes place; an event; occurrence." Another meaning is 
"that which happens aside from the main design; subordin-
ate action." Also "liable to happen; apt to occur; hence 
naturally happening or appertaining, especially as a sub-
ordinate or subsidiary feature." 
The word, "incidental" means "happening as a chance 
or undesigned feature of something; liable to happen or 
follow as a chance feature or incident." 
Applying these definitions to the statutory provisions 
we are here discussing, it appears that a disease which 
"directly arises as a natural incident of the exposure oc-
casioned by the employment" must be one which is a common 
event in that employment or occupation. A disease which is 
"incidental to the character of the business" is one which is 
liable to happen or apt to occur in the particular business. 
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Is the disease of osteoarthritis of the fingers one which 
"normally, commonly, ordinarily, regularly or usually oc-
curs" among stenographers in law offices? Is this disease 
"liable to happen or apt to occur" with very many women 
who do typing work as part of the duties of their employ-
ment? The answer to each of these questions very obviously 
is "No." 
There is no evidence in the record which even remotely 
tended to prove that finger arthritis is commonly or often 
found among people who do typing work, either in law of-
fices or any other employments. Dr. Beech testified that he 
had treated a great many cases of orteoarthritis, but Mrs. 
Edlund was the first one he had ever seen who claimed that 
it was associated with her work (R. 35 and 36). 
It appears that the Industrial Commission's decision 
was entirely correct, wherein it held that: 
"The legislature clearly intended to make com-
pensable only those diseases which can be recognized 
as commonly associated with a particular employ-
ment. 
* * * * * 
"The best evidence that such a risk exists would 
be a statistical demonstration that the incidence of 
the disease is significantly higher in the occupation 
under consideration than in others." 
At page 17 of his brief, Plaintiff's attorney argues that 
it would be difficult for Plaintiff to prove "that the disease 
from which she suffered was one which was commonly as-
sociated with her employment." He further argues that, 
because of that difficulty, she should therefore not be re-
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quired to make such proof. That kind of an argument is not 
properly addressed to the Supreme Court, or to the Indus-
trial Commission. It was the Utah Legislature which made 
the requirement found in Section 42-la-28, subsection 28, 
that: 
"Such a disease or injury to health shall be com-
pensable only in those instances where it is shown by 
the employee or his dependents that all of the follow-
ing named circurnstances zuere present:" 
Plaintiff's attorney goes on to argue that "the burden 
of showing common association or that the disease was a 
customary or usual result of the employment would be in-
surmountable." We fully agree with that statement insofar 
as it applies to Plaintiff's claim; and that is a decisive 
reason why Plaintiff does not have any valid claim under 
the occupational disease law. 
The Supreme Court has already recognized the necessity 
for any disease, for which compensation is claimed under the 
occupational disease law, to be one which is found quite often 
in a particular industry or occupation. In the first case 
under this law which came before this Court, Uta-Carbon 
Coal Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 567, 140 Pac. (2nd) 649, 
the Court's opinion, at pages 57 4 and 575, reads as follows : 
"Section 42-la-27, U. C. A. 1943, provides that: 
"The occupational diseases hereinafter defined 
shall be deemed to arise out of the employment, only 
if there is a direct causal connection between the 
conditions under which the work is performed and 
the occupational disease, and which can be seen to 
have followed as a natural incident of the work as 
the result of the exposure occasioned by the employ-
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ment, and which can be fairly traced to the employ. 
ment as the proximate cause, and which does not 
come from a hazard to which workmen would have 
been equally exposed outside of the employment. 
The disease must be incidental to the character of 
the business and not independent of the relation of 
employer and employee. The disease need not have 
been foreseen or expected but after its contraction 
it must appear to have had its origin in a risk con-
nected with the employment, and to have flowed from 
that source as a natural consequence." 
"It is well known that silicosis is an occupational 
disease. As has been said in Argonaut Min. Co. vs. 
Industrial Commission, 21 Cal. App. 2d 942, 79 P. 2d 
216, at page 219: 
" 'It (silicosis) is prevalent among employees in 
mines, potteries, stone and slate factories * * * 
where the air is permeated with minute particles of 
stone, quartz, slate, or metal dust which is inhaled 
to the detriment of the tissues, glands and lungs. 
Some men appear to be immune to the disease, but a 
large proportion of those who are engaged in such 
pursuits are susceptible to silicosis. The incurring 
and development of this disease depends somewhat 
upon the constitution of the employee and upon the 
conditions under which he works. The course of the 
disease may be rapid or gradual, sometimes extend-
ing over a period of several years before the victim 
is finally disabled for the performance of manual 
labor'." 
As Plaintiff's attorney has indicated in his brief, Plain-
tiff's claim is one without precedent. We also, have been 
unable to find any case, from this or any other state, in 
which a similar factual and legal situation was involved. 
The case cited in Plaintiff's brief: Simpson Logging Co. vs. 
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Dept. of Labor & Industries, 32 Wash. 2d 472, 202 P. 2d 
448, is not particularly helpful, because of the dissimilarity 
of the laws of the states of Utah and Washington. The 
provision of the \V ashington law involved in the Simpson 
case is very short, as follows : 
"Within the contemplation of this act, 'occupa-
tional disease' means such disease or infection as 
arises naturally and proximately out of extrahaz-
ardous employment." (Chapter 235, 1941 Laws.) 
There is one paragraph which may be helpful in the 
consideration of the case at bar, found in 58 American Juris-
prudence at page 7 49, ( § 246), which reads as follows : 
"Certain diseases and infirmities which develop 
gradually and imperceptibly as a result of engaging 
in particular employments and which are generally 
known and understood to be usual incidents or haz-
ards thereof, are distinguished from those having a 
traumatic origin, or otherwise developing suddenly 
and unexpectedly, by the terms 'occupational,' and 
'industrial.' If the disease is not a customary or na-
tural result of the profession or industry, per se, but 
is the consequence of some extrinsic condition or in-
dependent agency, the disease or injury cannot be 
imputed to the occupation or industry, and is in no 
accurate sense an occupational or industrial disease." 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein set forth, the decision of the 
Industrial Commission should be affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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